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LOCAL LAW IN FEDERAL TAXATION
By EDMOND N. CAHN t
"Uniformity is an instant operation onl individuals, without tle inter-
vention of assessments, or any regard to states, and is at once easy.
certain, and efficacious."
Mr. justice Patersun 1171-4 11
"We shall get nowhere rapidly with the problem of simplificatiun
until we recognize that what we bravely call uniformity on a natiunal
scale is a myth."
Randolph E. Paul (l0938) -
I.
THE federal idea is the distinctive political device of our age, as the
feudal and imperial ideas were of eras past. Since the eighteenth century.
it has characterized every new development in national and international
organization. Its acceptance is due to the success with which general
affairs are administered without prejudice to local interests and tradi-
tions. That success has varied greatly during the federal era and today
the federal idea is at its probable nadir. The more remote causes of our
present crisis in federalism may be economic or military, but the signs
and manifestations are fiscal. In nation after nation, financial hegemony
of the central government has canceled, in whole or principal part, the
concept of local autonomy. Some of these cancellations have developed
within existing constitutional limits (as in the Soviet Union or the Do-
minion of Canada). Others have strained constitutional structure (as
in the Commonwealth of Australia) or have so distorted the theoretic
balance as to introduce political unitarianisn (as in the Argentine Re-
public). In each case, however, central fiscal control has been the fulcrum
by which local sovereignty was lifted from its base.
The Concept of Uniformity. The constitutional provision fur aplpr-
tionment of representatives and direct taxes among the states according
to their respective populations was a remnant of the old "requisition"
system which proved so disastrous under the Articles of Confederation. 3
Under this provision the new Federal Government could finance itself by
direct taxes, but only through the devious and impractical process of ap-
portionment. If the levy were on real property, the complications might
I Member of the New York Bar.
1. Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171, 180 (U. S. 1796).
2. PAUL, STDIES IN FznDE:AL TAXATION, SECOND SMEFS (1938) 5.
3. See Randolph's summary in FA.xp, REcoms OF RE FEDMnzn. CUNV;NzON
(rev. ed. 1937) 18; FISKE, THE CRITICAL PUa0D OF AnIluc. His'roa, (1883). The
best analysis is that in THE FEnMuALIST (1783) Nos. 15-21, 30. See also PAnc, TrCi
Cess (1776) Nos. X, XI.
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be endless, for there could be no dependable concomitance between respec-
tive populations (the Constitution's formula) and respective land values.
Local assessment methods differed widely as to interval of valuation, tech-
nique of appraisal, enforcement of collection and the multifarious other
factors involved in distributing a single state levy among its citizens.4
Those who had seen the Articles of Confederation dissolve in bank-
ruptcy, futility and anarchy, succeeded in conferring a general taxing
power on the new Government, a power to levy "taxes, duties, imposts and
excises." And it was provided that '-all duties, imposts and excises should
be uniform throughout the United States." The so-called requirement
of uniformity had little significance in the early years of the Republic.
It was regarded not so much as a criterion for federal tax policy as an
escape from the dilemma of "apportionment," an "easy, certain, and effica-
cious" formula to remedy the "fundamental error" I of apportionment.
As the Federal Government subsisted during the nineteenth century
largely on "imposts, excises and duties" with but transitory resort to
income or inheritance taxes,' the implications of "uniformity" remained
dormant. Local law presented few difficulties in the administration of
federal duties. If there were problems, they might well relate to direct
taxes and the formula for apportionment. For example, in the series of
direct taxes levied from 1798 to 1861, the Congress classified real estate
and slaves together, one reason being that local law regarded slaves as
real property.7 Whatever political motives may have supported this cate-
gorization, it remains a striking instance of deference to state nomen-
clature. Although this deference ended early in 1861, "uniformity" re-
tained its original constitutional background.
The twentieth century has changed all this as increasingly complex
statutes of income and estate taxation have conferred a new meaning upon
the word "uniform." "Uniform throughout the United States" has be-
come a canon of judicial and administrative action, supported by the Con-
stitution, but transcending the limited purposes which we have described.
True, the objective was implicit from the beginning; for as early as the
Hylton case, we find:
4. We have an excellent record of the problem and its solution preserved in Hylton
v. United States, 3 Dall. 171 (U. S. 1796). The litigation was interesting for a variety
of reasons: (1) it was the first in which the Supreme Court assumed to pass upon the
constitutionality of an act of Congress; (2) the "facts" of the case were frankly manu-
factured, the government even agreeing to pay counsel fees on both sides; and (3) it wag
decided by only three of the six Justices. See 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME CoUR IN UTlrnm
STATES HisTORy (1922) 146-49. The contrast with modern practice is illustrated by
United States v. Johnson, 318 U. S. 189 (1943).
5. See THE FEDERALiST (1788) No. 21.
6. See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 (1900).
7. The history of these direct taxes is contained in Springer v. United States, 102
U. S. 586 (1800). In a sense, we have here a legislative instance of the interesting "quali-
fication" problem, to be considered in part III infra.
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"The truth is, that the articles taxed in one state should be taxed
in another; in this way the spirit of jeali usy is appeased, and tran-
quillity preserved; in this way the pressure on industry will be
equal in the several states, and the relation between the different
subjects of taxation duly preserved." s
But the requirement was then thought an "easy, certain and efficacious"
formula for the Congress, not a profoundly difficult and complex duty of
the courts. The recalcitrances of local law were hardly suspected, much
less the subtlety of modern tenures and business techniques. In the Hylton
case the Court did not mention corporate consolidations, optional marital
community or alimony trusts, but simply "articles."
Some Recent History. A quick reference to modern developments
will suffice here, since the details of this topic are already available in Mr.
Paul's study.' The current period begins with Tylr -,. United States,",
in which the United States Supreme Court upheld estate taxation of
tenancies by the entirety. That litigation involved residents of Pennsyl-
vania and Maryland, where "the amiable fiction of the common law"
that husband and wife were one still survived. Hence it was urged that
no interest in such tenancies passed by reason of death. The Court replied
that there was at death a ripening of property rights and enjoyment in
the surviving spouse and that the legislative treatment of this type of
transaction was a reasonable provision against tax avoidance.
During the following year, Poe v. Scaborn " sustained division of
community income in Washington and certain other community property
states. The case rested, at least in part, upon a statutory construction, for
the Court pointed to the legislative phrase "income of every individual"
and held that "of" denoted ownership, not mere control. The husband's
control, restricted in various respects by local law, was not regarded as
tantamount to ownership of the whole. This decision has been so fre-
quently analyzed and criticized that present purposes will be met by a
single observation. Control was later held to be a sufficient gravamen
for taxation even in the Hoeper 12 case and in a multitude of subsequent
decisions.
Yet the cleavage between the majority and dissenting views in Hoeper
v. Tax Commission of Wisconsin appeared to be just beyond the limits
of the control concept. The majority, holding unconstitutional a Wis-
consin statute taxing, in effect, the income of both spouses to the husband,
accepted both ownership and control as permissible bases of taxation.
8. Hylton . United States, 3 DalL 171, 180 (U. S. 1796).
9. See PAUL, The Effect on Federal Taxation of Local Rides of Properly in Strutms
IN FEDERA. TAxATION, SEcoND SERIEs (1938). See also PAUL AND MIr-rE:S, LAW ox
FEDERAL IN.coim T.AXLATIOx (1934) § 33.38.
10. 281 U. S. 497 (1930).
11. 282 U. S. 101 (1930).
12. Hoeper v. Tax Commission of Wisconsin, 284 U. S. 206 (1931).
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But Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Stone contended for a further grava-
men-enjoyment 3-- and not long after, their concept evidently prevailed
in Douglas v. Willcuts.4
One distinct effect of the impact of local law upon federal taxation may
be traced here. As local institutions and modes of tenure refuse to con-
form to accepted tax theories, they tend to be engulfed by tax concepts
expanded for that very purpose. Such an extension may be effected by
Congress, as in the instance of estate taxation of life insurance," but in
the evolution of the principal limitations, most of the ingenuity, most of
the progress, has been furnished by the Supreme Court. The merit of
this expansive technique is obvious: recalcitrant local institutions are
neither ignored nor obsequiously exempted; they are taxed in terms of
a novel concept suitable to themselves. The novel concept will generally
appear as an alternative to familiar theories, rather than in lieu of them.
The progression in theory thus remains both logical and cumulative.
In Morgan v. Commissioner a federal estate tax on property passing
under a general power of appointment was applied to what was defined
by state statute as a special power. The court said:
"State law creates legal interests and rights. The federal revenue
acts designate what interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed.
...If it is found in a given case that an interest or right created
by local law was the object intended to be taxed, the federal law
must prevail no matter what name is given to the interest or right
by state law." '1
But tax practitioners had observed with chagrin that the Treasury, in
Rudolph Wurlitzer Company v. Commissioner,17 also knew how to use
13. This dissent was in keeping with Holmes's theory of the predominant significance
of consumption. See BIDDLE, MR. JUsTIcE HoLIEs (1942) 90.
14. 296 U. S. 1 (1935). See, e.g., Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940).
15. The confusion and vacillation in the estate taxation of life insurance proceeds is
a familiar story, summarized in 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFr TAxATIoN (1942)
c. ID. This history culminated in Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U. S. 264 (1938), which
held that under the applicable regulations, the decedent's payment of premiums was the
sole gravamen of taxability, and that his possessing legal incidents of ownership in the
policies would not support the tax. The departure in section 404 of the 1942 Act was the
adoption of alternative criteria of taxation, that is to say, either premium payment or inci-
dents of ownership could be availed of in support of the tax.
16. 309 U. S. 78, 80 (1940). Reference to local law may be "inferred from the
nature of the problem with which Congress was dealing." Jerome v. United States, 318
U. S. 101, 104 (1943). The federal law follows the local property rule and will not neces-
sarily accord with the local tax rule. For example, a federal estate tax deduction will
be granted for commissions allowable under local law computed upon gains or increases
realized during administration, although no corresponding state deduction is permitted,
See Lewis v. Bowers, 19 F. Supp. 745 (S. D. N. Y. 1937) ; Matter of Hard, 24 N. Y. S.
(2d) 867 (App. Div. 1941).
17. 81 F. (2d) 971 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936). The question here was whether certain
preferred stock was non-voting, so as to permit compliance with the statutory conditions
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local law. That significant case held that the role of local law in federal
taxation is not confined to rules of property but embraces every category
of relevant statute or decision. Thus it was established that taxpayers
could not avail themselves of "uniformity" as a technique of tax avoid-
ance, and the Treasury could hardly be expected to honor the principal by
loss of revenue. Some thought, in their bitterness, that uniformity had
become only a new implement of the Commissioner,18 that he could respect
or ignore local law, as the interests of the fisc required.
The Stuart "o case, however, has allayed these fears. After suitable
obeisance in the direction of the Morgan and similar decisions, the Court
relegates an entire segment of tax criteria to the rules of local la:,,,:
"When Congress fixes a tax on the possibility of the revesting of
property or the distribution of income, the 'necessary implication,'
we think, is that the possibility is to be determined by the state law.
Grantees under deeds, wills and trusts, alike, take according to the
rule of the state law. The power to transfer or distribute assets
of a trust is essentially a matter of local law." 20
Perhaps the broad implications of these phrases will not be sustained
by subsequent rulings; but in any event, they offer the necessary anti-
thesis to the Morgan doctrine. Since law is a conceptual science, the
boundaries of nomenclature remain indistinct.21 Names flow freely into
the realm of substance, so that mere rejection of local titles and labels
would only begin to solve the problem. Nanes in law are heavily en-
crusted with real distinctions and implications. Where nomenclature end,-
and substantial difference begins-that is the question.
In addition to this judicial activity, Congress has been exceedingly
busy.2 2 The Committee reports relating to the Revenue Act of 1942 dis-
close persistent and strenuous efforts to achieve uniformity. 3 In the Act
itself local rules, local distinctions and presumptions are explicitly de-
clared void, irrelevant, unavailable. Pervading the statute is the ideal
of a uniform national tax system, which will operate equally and with
for filing a consolidated return. The articles of incorporation of the taxpayer deprived
the stock of voting power, and it did not appear that any preferred stockholder had Eought
to exercise the right to vote. The Commissioner was nevertheless sustained in his con-
tention that, since the charter provision was in direct violation of local (Illinois) law,
the shares must be regarded as voting stock.
18. Compare Higgins v. Smith, 30S U. S. 473 (1940).
19. Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154 (1942).
20. Id. at 161.
21. See Madison's brilliant exposition in Tn" FED-E usr (178S) No. 37.
22. There was, at the same time, a reexamination of a substantial part of the tax
structure, culminating after approximately six months debate in Pub. L. No. 753, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 21, 1942).
23. See illustrations in Report of the Finance Committee on H. R. 7378, Srzz. Rr'.
No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) §§ 120, 402, 403.
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identical incidence "on individuals, without ... any regard to states."
But is such uniformity attainable?
II.
Clearly, the question just posed cannot be answered a priori. Nor in
all probability can a single, categorical answer be induced. Yet a series of
specific instances, all involving the quest for uniformity, can be surveyed;
and such relative inferences as they may inspire can be drawn.
One or two preliminary generalizations appear. In the first place, when
the principal problem is one of collection procedure, uniformity will be
almost perfect. Diversities of local law are entitled to respect where they
bear upon the ownership, use or transfer of property; but they can hardly
be permitted to interfere with the process of enforcing federal tax assess-
ments. As a matter of elementary self-preservation, the national govern-
ment must pass over state variations, whether founded in reason, history
or mere idiosyncracy, to the end of collecting its bills. Thus local exemp-
tion statutes cannot influence the superior claims of the Federal Treasury;
nor can the latter be compelled to honor state procedure as to recording of
liens.' In the practice of collection, national supremacy implies maximum
uniformity.
In the second place, there are important forces transcending state lines
which make for substantive uniformity. There is more affinity, for ex-
ample, between the interests, the techniques, the customs, the modes of
bookkeeping of bankers in different, even distant, states than between those
of bankers and farmers within the same state. Social and economic hori-
zontal stratifications are frequently more potent than the vertical stratifi-
cations of state boundaries. The latter are conceptual and economically
artificial; the former, pragmatic, visible and politically active. Madison
saw these "factions" as a possible menace to republican society, and he
rightly 'called for an everlastingly recurrent balancing of their many in-
terests.2 5 But the "factions" have proven something more than mere
brawlers in the arena of government: they have joined hands across
legal borders and have converted the federal idea into a national union.
Nationwide similarity in economic activities has, of course, long been
reflected in our tax laws, and, in fact, antedates the Constitution. What
is new is the growing sensitiveness of classification as between business
and business. The stress of war has exposed distinctions which long re-
mained implicit. What neater summation could be found than the present
language of section 722 of the Internal Revenue Code? Industry is here
segregated from industry in terms fearfully abstract, but translatable
24. See Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U. S. 329 (1943) ; Michigan v. United
States, 317 U. S. 338 (1943). See also PAUL, op. cit. supra note 9, at 47.
25. THE FFERALIST (1788) No. 10.
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into just those objectives and experiences which businessmen intimately
know,26 such as abnormality of output, interruptions of production, in-
dustry-wide depression or eccentricity of profits cycle.
The stratifications of business transcending state lines have had their
effects on the movement toward uniform state laws. restatement of the
law, and expansion of the interstate commerce clause. What might he
assumed, by way of hypothesis, is that uniformity in the operation if
federal taxes is more feasible as to the various categories of imnniercial
law than as to the traditional institutions of personal law. This hypt stliesis
might be explained, in part, by the more general statutory codification
of commercial law. The principal cause, however, is that personal law,
being more firmly tied to the traditions, history and mores of the state,
yields slowly and stubbornly to centripetal impulses.2 7 It enjoys the same
"cultural" distinctiveness which the Russian, Canadian and Swiss Consti-
tutions have sought to preserve. If our assumption is correct, we have
here a significant moral for federalism.
Alimony and Separate-Maintenance Paynwuts. The purposes of sec-
tion 120 of the 1942 Revenue Act are familiar. This section was enacted
not only to shift the tax burden to the spouse actually receiving alimony
payments, but also to produce national uniformity in the tax treatment *
these payments.2' The Supreme Court, beginning with a clear concept
in Douglas v. Willcuts 2 that income used to discharge the duty of sup-
port was taxable to the husband, had taken an inviting turn in the FilchP
and Leonard 3 cases, relying on local law to determine the nature of the
husband's duty, had begun to feel uneasy in the Fuller '2 decision in which
the taxpayer successfully took advantage of local law, and had come close,
in Pearce v. Commissioner," to leaving the road entirely. It seemed time
for a change of route.
The pangs of draftsmanship are all too manifest in the new section
120. In the practice of law, instruments tend to grow and foliate far
beyond original expectations; and here what began as a simple deter-
mination to shift the tax burden to the recipient ended as a substantial
code of rules and particularized presumnptions. As new possibilities and
sets of fact were envisaged, section 120 was expanded to embrace them.
It seemed that there would never be an end to the needed qualifications
26. This section has already ended a copious literature. See Iiller, Relief Prozisions
of the New Excess Profits Tax Act (1943) 21 TAXES 195.
27. Perhaps for the same reason that the most primitive (and by like token, the most
important) verbs are irregular in various languages.
28. See Report of tle Finance Committee on H. R. 7378, loc. cit. supra note 23.
29. 296 U. S. 1 (1935).
30. Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U. S. 149 (1940).
31. Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U. S. S0 (1940).
32. Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U. S. 69 (1940).
33. 315 U. S. 543 (1942). See Comment (1942) 56 HAv. L. REv. 428, 437.
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despite the initial confinement of the section to cases of divorce or legal
separation.
Nevertheless many questions implicit in the section were unanswered
by those qualifications. Since a divorce or legal separation was the point
of departure, could not the Commissioner question its validity? ' Since
a separation agreement might be the occasion for payments, could not
the Commissioner challenge the agreement under requirements or in-
hibitions of local law? Is a long anterior separation agreement a "written
instrument incident to such divorce or separation"? Does an antenuptial
agreement '1 or an agreement subsequent to the decree or an order amend-
ing the decree " constitute such an instrument? As the statute speaks of
"minor children of such husband," what does it intend as to adult incom-
petents, and what law fixes the age of majority?
But there are graver difficulties than those presented by these questions.
In order to embrace the many ramifications and vagaries of particular
cases, the section sets up a variety of ironclad presumptions. These pre-
sumptions are simply instances of "drawing the line somewhere" and are
clearly defensible once one admits the necessity of a line.31 But the some-
where can apparently mean anywhere. The presumed application of in-
sufficient payments is a case in point. Local law is honored, in part, by
excepting from the new general rule, payments for support of minor
children-provided that the share so applicable is fixed by "the terms of
the decree or written instrument." Statute or decision is irrelevant; the
share must be designated in the bond. This rule is perhaps defensible.
But if the aggregate payments prove insufficient, section 120 simply at-
tributes them first to the children's share, in quite possible defiance not
'only of statute and decision but of the decree or agreement itself. Thus
the husband who pays less than he ought, perhaps for reasons of genuine
inability, is, in addition, penalized taxwise.
But the wife too has her complaints. She may not avoid tax liability
for the children's shares unless the terms of the decree or agreement ex-
34. It goes without saying that such a result would be socially undesirable, but ex-
treme cases (such as "mail order" divorces) might necessitate it. The proportions of the
problem are reduced by Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942). See also
Part III infra.
35. The regulations answer this question in the negative, unless the ante-nuptial
agreement is somehow incorporated in a separate agreement or decree. U. S. Treas. Reg.
103, § 19.22(k) -1. Thus a line once drawn calls for another line.
36. Both an agreement subsequent to the decree and an order amending the decree,
if obtainable under local law, apparently satisfy the statute. Ibid,
37. "In law as in life, lines have to be drawn. But the fact that a line has to be drawn
somewhere does not justify its being drawn anywhere. The line must follow some direc-
tion of policy, whether rooted in logic or experience. Lines should not be drawn simply
for the sake of drawing lines." Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in Pearce
v. Commissioner, 315 U. S. 543, 558 (1942).
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pressly fix the respective proportions. Thus the wife's tax on moneys
allocable, under mandate of both conscience and local law, to the benefit
of the children may actually exceed her own nominal share. In any case,
spouses operating under one set of rules as to their taxes and another as
to familial duties, are bound to be perplexed. Nor are these difficulties
none the less real because they operate only within a single family unit,
for the unit has, by hypothesis, been split.
The difficulties created by section 120 illustrate the compulsion engen-
dered by the insistance upon statutory uniformity within the area of per-
sonal law to enact, not a tax statute, but a whole code of substantive rules
and irrebuttable presumptions, and the consequent creation of two parallel
and frequently conflicting canons of regulation. The potential harm is
exceedingly great, for the main purpose of the Federal Revenue Code is to
facilitate and make uniform tax administration, regardless of the ethics
and ethos of state codes. Here, for instance, even if we assume that the
Federal Government should regulate the incidents of marital dissolution,0
we are justified in insisting upon a regulation in terms of all the social
objectives involved. And these are too large even for a Ways and Means
Committee.
The point is that all taxes have some regulatory effect, and the more
itemized and particularized the tax statute, the more incisive and detailed
its regulation. No one can doubt that future decrees and separation agree-
ments will be drafted with one eye to section 120, and the other to the
normal inclinations, needs and interests of the spouses and their children.
If Congress "draws the line somewhere" in such great detail, it plots
out a shape to which transactions are induced to conform. Thus the
eventual incidence of the section is warped by its own normative in-
fluence. What was conceived as a tax rule, convenient, though roughly
pragmatic, ends as a pattern for action, a guide to the draftsman for which
he discards the precedents in office files and formbooks. One is reminded
of the statutory "standard clauses" for insurance policies.
Perhaps Congress had no other choice. Perhaps it was impossible or
at least impracticable to shift the tax incidence of alimony payments
without undertaking this mosaic of draftsmanship. This proposition,
however, is at least debatable, for much in section 120 could have been
left to the accustomed distinctions of local law. And even the new section
is not wholly emancipated from state rules, for who will make bold to
interpret a decree or separation agreement without some deference to
them? In support of specificity it will be argued that disregard for local
law and the resulting inflexibility are not too high a price to pay for ex-
actness and certainty. Better a precise line, even in the wrong place, than a
38. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's resum6 of federal control over marriage and divorce
in other countries, in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 237, 304 (1942).
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series of scattered dots; and if spouses choose to follow this line in agree-
ments and decrees, the incidental harm in a few cases cannot outweigh the
advantages, both to the Treasury and to the taxpayer, of fixing and an-
choring tax liability.
This view has prevailed in the disparate area of gift and estate taxes.
Federal regulation of inheritance,3 9 though an encroachment on the tradi-
tional preserves of the states, seems warranted by more than convenience
of tax collection. The changes in the nature and shape of our economy
have converted large aggregations of capital wealth into a federal problem,
appropriate for control by federal regulatory taxation. Although the same
may be true of the area of marital dissolutions, there is nothing peculiar
to its dissolution which makes the marital state a federal concern if it is
not such from its inception.
But even with respect to inheritance, where the federal interest clearly
appears, regulation should be intelligent, purposeful, teleological-not an
uncalculated incident of fiscal convenience. Certainly these criteria apply
a fortiori to the institutions of marriage and family, which have tradition-
ally been placed on a plane considerably above that of income, property
and taxes. If it be inevitable that Congress legislate upon such subjects,
let it do so advisedly and solemnly, after weighing the laws and customs
of the various states and the probable impact of its contemplated fiscal
design. In such instances, a commission of authorities, interested in
social consequences rather than revenue yield, might be called to council.
The values involved are prime; they should not remain mere fiscal by-
products.
Powers of Appointment. Here again Congress advisedly sought a uni-
form national rule, and with a substantial measure of success. The Com-
mittee reports include such brave phrases as "regardless of the nomen-
clature used in creating the power and local property law connotations,"
and "to be construed so as to give uniform Federal application." 40 For
present purposes, only two aspects of the new section 811 (f) are im-
portant: has it achieved complete uniformity and is it objectionable in the
same sense as the alimony section, that is, does it crudely regulate a field
reserved for state control?
The Stuart 41 opinion seems to refer most questions concerning wills,
trusts and deeds to local law, a proposition which would have been self-
evident to the framers of our Constitution.4' But, in federal taxation,
it is generally understood that local law enters the scene only by Con-
gressional leave, only when, expressly or by "necessary implication," Con-
gress adopts it as determinative of the particular gravamen. Perhaps the
39. See Cahn, Federal Regulation of Inheritance (1940) 88 U. oF PA. L. Rvv. 297.
40. Report of the Finance Committee on H. R. 7378, snpra note 23, § 403.
41. Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154 (1942).
42. See THE FEDERAmST (1788) No. 31.
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phrase "necessary implication" has more than a single meaning. The
"implication" may be "necessary" where the statutory language indi-
cates legislative intent to point to local law. It may be equally "necessary"
under Constitutional mandate, for as classifications for federal taxation
drift farther and farther away from local property rules, they may event-
ually run afoul of the Fifth Amendment. The power of Congress to
categorize for purposes of effectual tax administration is deservedly broad,
but it is probably not without limits. The gap between property, as defined
by local law, and taxable class, must be traversable by a bridge of reason.
Fortunately, the daily operations of the Commissioner and the courts
prove more realistic than the fond hopes of Cungressional committees.
Vhen local law seems clearly determinative, its appropriateness is taken
for granted-all proclamations and admonitions to the contrary notwith-
standing. -When, for example, section 811 (f) (2) (B) says "if the
power is not exercisable to any extent for the benefit of the decedent,"
it invites resort to local law-coincidentally, in precisely the respect in-
volved in the Stuart case. \When provision is made exempting powers
"released" before a certain date, what other than local law can determine
whether there has been a release? " And surely the most critical question
involved in this section, namely, what classes of beneficiaries may be
appointed under a particular will or deed, will be resolved in the light of
state statutes and decisions. Here, at least, there is no "uniform federal
application."
Of course, section 811 (f) has long influenced the forms of inter vivos
and testamentary disposition. As amended, it will continue such regu-
latory effect with increasing force and intensity, for rates are higher and
the section is much more explicit. But here, as has already been indicated,
the subject is one of direct federal concern, involving as it does a device
for the transmission of capital wealth. Thus, although there is regulation
in the most obvious sense, it is warranted-if intelligent.
Section 811 (f) meets the objections which we raised to the alimony
sectioh. It follows the bend and flow of traditional distinctions, preserv-
ing them when they are substantial, passing over them when they are
merely nominal.4  It groups the taxable and segregates the exempt not
43. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.24. Various states have subsequently enacted
statutes extending or clarifying the right to release and the appropriate procedure. See,
e.g., Naw Yoax REAL PROPERTY LAw § 183. For a proposal to emancipate tle problem
from local law, see Alexamnder, Taxation of Powers of Appointncnt utrdcr the Rcvcnue
Act of 1942 (1943) 56 HARv. L. Rxv. 742; Griswold, Poa'ers of Appointwent ai:d the New
Revenw Act-A Foreword (1943) 56 R-nv. L. REv. 739. The rebuttable presumption of
releasability conferred by the regulations goes about as far as federal rules permit. 'Many
incongruities would arise if powers were conclusively releasable for purposes of the
estate tax, though demonstrably not susceptible of release under local law.
44. See Griswold, Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax (1939) 52
HARv. L. Rav. 929, for the motifs of the new statute. Much material of value in interpre-
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according to arbitrary lines or mere administrative convenience, but with
sensitive fidelity to the economics and the ethics of its topic. If trans-
actions are taxed which previously escaped, the reason for the new cate-
gorization is evident. For example, the conveyancer's metaphysics of
Helvering v. Grihmel145 has been discarded by the amendment. Finally,
when rights and duties under local law determine tax incidence, this section
does not forbid resort to statute and decision, or, like section 120, confine
the Court's view to the words and terms of the particular instrument.
Community Interests. The 1942 Revenue Act whittles off the first
segment of special privileges enjoyed by residents of community property
states. A new section 811 (e) (2) provides that all of the community
interests, instead of the former one-half thereof, shall be included in com-
puting a decedent's gross estate for death tax purposes. Here again the
Committee reports dismiss local law from the scene.
4
1
But the statute itself attempts no such dismissal. It speaks of property
"held as community property by the decedent and surviving spouse under
the law of any State, Territory, or possession of the United States, or
any foreign country" and thus directly compels resort to local law for
the categorization of any particular item. The delineation of the marital
community varies considerably from state to state, 47 and so will the ap-
plication of the section. Moreover, the second sentence of section 811
(e) (2) provides that the taxable community interest shall in no case be
less than the share which "was subject to decedent's power of testament-
ary disposition." 4s This particular minimum is clearly a function of
local law.
Section 811 (e) (2) excepts from the community interest "compen-
sation for personal services actually rendered by the surviving spouse or
derived originally from such compensation or from separate property."
These exceptions might seem to invite difficulties, for their classification
varies from state to state. But the section is skillfully drafted. It excepts
such part of the interest held as community property. Hence the opera-
tion here is very clear: determine whether an item is or is not community
property under substantive rules of local law; in this process, the cus-
tation of the new statute is to be found in Eisenstein, Powers of Appoiniment and Estate
Taxes (1943) 52 YALE L. J. 296, 494.
45. 294 U. S. 153 (1935).
46. Report of the Finance Committee on H. R. 7378, supra note 23, § 402.
47. Compare, for example, CAL. CIVIL CODE § 162-72a, with LA. CIVIL CoDE arts.
2386-2404.
48. Query whether the LA. CIvn. CODE arts. 1493 et seq., creating "forced portions"
for children and others, puts such property beyond the testator's power of testamentary
disposition under the second sentence of section 811 (e) (2)? As the decedent has
certain testamentary control over the manner of payment of such portions and may, Under
specified circumstances, LA. CrvI. CoDE arts. 1617 et seq., disinherit entirely, the answer
should be negative.
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tomary presumptions attach to the Commissioner's findings and may not
be offset by contrary state presumptions ;40 if an item is thus found to
be community property, it may still be excluded by actual proof (without
aid of local presumptions) of identity or origin within the excepted class;
then the effect of the minimum provision under the second sentence is de-
termined, substantive doctrines of local law again being applied, after
the presumptions involved in the Commissioner's findings have been given
effect. In these proceedings, the Commissioner may be found on either
side of the fence. Especially where the wife dies first, he will contend for
classification as community property. Taxpayers, who have always cut
their cases to their pocketbooks, are slowly beginning to recover from
the shock induced by the Commissioner's doing likewise.
What has been achieved here is not literal uniformity, but rather a
fine measure of equality and fairness. Local law still pervades estate tax-
ation of community property, but the variations will henceforth conform
to the economic facts of the situation. Taxes will fall, as they ought,
upon those who own, control or enjoy. The superficial uniformity that
ignores local diversity is not to be found here. Uniformity of burden
and incidence has been attained. And in a federal system this would ap-
pear the only legitimate objective.
Estate Tax Deductions and Miscellaneous Other Topics. It will be
observed that the problems involved in the "uniformity" concept have
little to do with local nomenclature and, in fact, begin to disclose their
true nature only when that nomenclature is thrust aside. The Pelter ,"
decision introduced just such a chain of development*' when it established
a national definition of "present" interests for purposes of the gift
tax exclusion. Local labels were discarded, but the substance and essen-
tial character of particular interests continued to be drawn from state law.
49. Resort to "explanatory legislative history" is warranted despite the apparent
clarity of the statute. See Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U. S. 476 (1943). Cf.
Radin, A Short Vay with Statutes (1942) 56 HAv. L. Ray. 3M. We may accordingly
rely upon the Comnrittee reports to the effect that "state presumptions are therefore not
operative against the Commissioner." See Report of the Finance Connn'ttee on H. R.
7378, supra note 23, § 402. The effect is cancellation of the authority uf Howard v.
United States, 125 F. (2d) 986 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942), in which the taxpayer was permitted
to eke out inadequate proof by use of the local presumption. The pertinent rebuttable pre-
sumption of LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2404, 2405, is clearly not a local property rule, and was
mistakenly accorded weight in a case arising under federal law. Moreover, as such dis-
putable presumptions are mere local rules of evidence, they should not be available to the
Commissioner despite his greater difficulty in ascertaining and proving the true facts.
The ordinary presumptions in favor of the Collector (regularity of exaction) and uf the
Commissioner (correctness of findings) are sufficient.
50. United States v. Pelzer, 312 U. S. 399 (1941).
51. See Smith v. Commissioner, 131 F. (2d) 254 ,C. C. A. 8th, 1942); Commis-
sioner v. Lowden, 131 F. (2d) 127 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942).
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Moreover, many of the complaints raised by enthusiasts for uniformity
may be traced not to local law but to unwise construction of federal law.
It is rather late now to criticize the line of cases reversed by section 405 of
the 1942 Revenue Act, limiting estate tax deductions to the amount of
estate property available to pay them, but it may fairly be said that their
rule was both unfortunate and unnecessary. 2 Section 405 rescues the
subject from its former fantastic condition, imposed by the circuit courts.
But where is the uniformity? Surely the allowable deductions will
vary more than ever from state to state, along with local rules of exemp-
tion and payment of debts. In fact, the new section uses the phrase "under
the applicable law," to wit, the law of the jurisdictional situs. In the
superficial sense, the new version of section 405 has contributed nothing
to "a nationwide system of taxation."
Viewed from the standpoint of equitable taxation, however, the amend.
ment is excellent. It establishes a principle which, while variable in its local
application, inevitably results in justice and fair treatment. This is the
highest type of fiscal uniformity, one which consists not in calling disparate
things by the same name but in classifying and grouping them under an
unchangeable rule of reason. Only in mathematics is equality a synonym
for identity. If, then, taxpayers under different local systems are treated
equally, if the tax burden is fairly shared without regard to mere geog-
raphy, uniformity in its substantial sense has been achieved.
Such accomplishments are the result of patient study for which good
intentions are no substitute. They must be sifted and thought through,
delayed, if necessary, in' enactment until their consequences are safely
predictable. An instance in point is the confusion exemplified by the Del
Drago case, in which the New York Court of Appeals held that Congress
had preEmpted the ultimate apportionment and incidence of the federal
estate tax and that a state statute of apportionment was therefore uncon-
stitutional." The Supreme Court reversed this decision,14 for although
the Internal Revenue Code contains incidence provisions" covering small
portions of the federal estate tax, the balance thereof is% left to local dis-
position. The Code incidence provisions are completely without system.
Hence, doubts as to constitutionality of local incidence statutes; hence,
separate federal causes of action governing only part of the federal estate
tax ;56 hence, probable conflicts between state and federal rules of appor-
tionment as to exemptions, widows' shares, life estates and the like. And
even while the Del Drago case was pending in the courts and focusing
52. See Helvering v. O'Donnell, 94 F. (2d) 852 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
53. h; re Del Drago's Estate, 287 N. Y. 61, 38 N. E. (2d) 131 (1941).
54. Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U. S. 95 (1942).
55. See INT. REv. CODE §826(b) (c) (1939).
56. See United States Trust Co. v. Sears, 29 F. Supp. 643 (D. Conn. 1939).
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attention on these confusions, Congress added to them by adopting the
new section 826 (d).
Obviously, these incidence provisions cannot stand as they are. They
may be expanded to cover the entire federal estate tax, or they may te
repealed. Since the present tax is imposed on the transmission rather
than the receipt of inheritance, the latter course would seem preferable.
In any case, this area should belong wholly to one or the other juris-
diction, not piecemeal to both. If the federal courts eventually do assume
exclusive jurisdiction, they will find state law indispensable as to the mean-
ing and effect of individual wills, even as to the purport of a clause di-
recting apportionment of the tax.5
Finally, we are entitled to ask whether disregard of local law serves the
interests of the Treasury. In such cases as the THurlitzeer ", and Keifferf'9
it was local law that brought in the tax upon transactions which would
have otherwise been exempted. These transactions were formed and
shaped by peculiarities of local policy until they fitted into taxable cate-
gories. The Commissioner raised the issue of state law and prevailed. If
he had not, avenues of tax avoidance would have been opened. It seems
more valuable to close those avenues than, by shutting our eyes to the
realities of the case, to attain a standard of impeccable uniformity. Taxes
concern practical matters, such as the incidents of right and duty created
by local law.
Summary. These illustrations make clear that absolute uniformity is
not attainable. A federal poll tax might come close, for individual human
beings are irreducible integers. Under the Constitution, however, such
a tax must be apportioned according to census of the entire population, so
that uniform imposition would involve collection from infants, aliens,
paupers, and so forth. Even these extreme measures, obviously unjust
and inadequate as revenue sources, could not effect perfect uniformity, in
view of the variation of the value of the dollar from time to time and
from state to state. Uniformity is at best a limit to be approached, not
an objective to be achieved.
57. See Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 238 N. Y. 4,8, 144 X. E. 7c9
(1924), cert. denied, 266 U. S. 633 (1925).
58. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co. v. Commissioner, 81 F. (2d) 971 (C. C. A. 0ith, 1936).
59. Felide G. Keiffer Estate, 44 B. T. A. 1265 (1941). Accord, Howard v. United
States, 125 F. (2d) 986 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942). It is interesting to note that the statute
involved in these cases, LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1749, was subsequently repealed. See L%.
CIVIL CODE (Supp. 1942) arts. 1749.1-.3. Perhaps the repeal was only post hoc, but
one may be permitted the surmise that it was also propter hoe. Thus federal taxation in-
fluences the shape of state civil laws and may serve to destroy old established institutions.
This particular statute had been part of the Louisiana Code since 1808, having been de-
rived from the Code Napoleon. See 3 LouIsIANA LEGAL Ancui-Vs (1940) pt. I, 963-64.
If there were non-tax reasons for its repeal, the local legislature does not appear to have
perceived them prior to these decisions.
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We have noted the senses in which uniformity is desirable. In the first
place, it helps to brush aside mere local labels and by the same token aids
in the quest of economic substance. So viewed, uniformity is simply an
instrument in the armory of concepts by which courts seek to break
through appearance to reality.6" In the second place, the desire for uni-
formity makes Congress and the courts more sensitive to the existence
of special privileges and keener in the formulation of techniques for their
removal. This is again a utilitarian value. In short, uniformity is not a
final good, to be sought at all costs, but an intermediate good, useful to
the extent that it serves larger ends. A federal philosophy requires room
for diversity,6 and local variations are not incompatible with a just tax
system.
III.
We now consider the problems incident to determination of applicable
local law, including the procedures involved in ascertaining the law of a
particular state, conflict of laws issues, and the function of the Supreme
Court in such processes. It is assumed for present purposes that local
law governs as to some critical link in the chain of tax reasoning, that,
expressly or by necessary implication, reference has been made to state
rules, and that the court and parties are sufficiently aware of the issue 01
so that local law is not simply taken for granted.
A preliminary distinction should be made here. So intensely have
students and courts been preoccupied with the ramifications of Erie Rail-
road v. Tompkins 63 that little organized thought has been accorded to
the wide area of federal jurisprudence which it does not touch. Even
where the problem arises under a federal statute, local law may be deter-
minative of the result. On a single day in January, 1943, the Supreme
Court held local law to control in three unrelated cases involving bank-
ruptcy,64 taxation," and public utility rates. 6 But even these instances,
60. See Cahn, Taxation: Some Reflections on tie Quest of Stibstance (1942) 30
GEo. L. J. 587.
* 61. The resolutions adopted on Dec. 21, 1942, in memory of Justice Brandeis and
presented to the Supreme Court by Judge Magruder, describe "one of his firmest con-
victions: that the strength of America lies in diversity, not uniformity; that local cul-
tures and traditions should be preserved and fostered, a sense of local responsibility quick-
ened, local leadership evoked and encouraged."
62. See Public Utilities Commission v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U. S. 456, 462
(1943).
63. See the articles and decisions collected in Zlinkoff, Erie v. Tompkins: In Rela-
tion to the Law of Trademarks and Unfair Competition (1942) 42 COL. L. REv. 955-66.
64. Harris v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Co., 317 U. S. 447 (1943).
65. Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U. S. 476 (1943).
66. Public Utilities Commission v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U. S. 456 (1943),
in which jurisdiction rested primarily upon a federal right of action although diversity
of citizenship also appeared.
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which might readily be multiplied, do not begin to show the limitations
of the Erie Railroad doctrine. What is more significant than the variety
of examples governed by local law, despite lack of diversity of citizenship,
is the broad territory in which a general federal law continues to reign.
This federal common law simply cannot be exorcised.
In the field of taxation, general law concepts are frequently used to
bulwark theories peculiar to that field. For example, if brothers create
simultaneous reciprocal trusts, each containing provisions which were
inspired by the presence of comparable provisions in the other, resort
will be had to chancery jurisprudence to achieve the desired tax result.'
The doctrines of the equity courts will be employed, not merely as in-
stances of analogous treatment of such arrangements, but as demonstra-
tive of the true and substantial relationships involved. In the same man-
ner, the federal courts will apply the common law canons of construction
to wills, deeds or statutes, all quite without evidence that these canons
exist in any specific local law.' In fact, most federal statutes would be
incomprehensible if the framework of modern common law, and of
twentieth century capitalism, were not assumed. It will be seen that these
powerful assumptions play a cogent role in the ascertainment of applicable
local law.
Local Law as a Question of Fact. Lawyers have become so accustomed
to calling foreign law a question of fact " that they would be disturbed
by any other characterization. It is, indeed, a strange species of fact,
the determination of which involves expert testimony or affidavits to edu-
cate the judge, briefing and argument almost identical in teclnique with
the presentation of issues of law, and decision in the form of a common
law "finding" of the rule, which is announced in an opinion containing
precedents, citations, textbook and statutory references, and the balance
of judicial paraphernalia for a holding of law. In the United States,
the distinction between law and fact is further obscured because federal
courts take judicial notice of state laws 70 and, in diversity of citizenship
cases, they become courts of the respective states.
At the risk of missing some excellent entertainment in metaphysics, we
shall by-pass this question. Whether local law is an issue of law or of
fact, or a "mixed issue of law and fact," is important only in terms of
67. See Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F. (2d) 99 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
6S. See, for example, the dissenting opinion in Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154,
171 (1942).
69. See forris, Law and Fact (1942) 55 HARv. L. Rzv. 1303. The distinction be-
tween law and fact is currently most conspicuous in determining the scopa of judicial
review of administrative findings. See Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Rctiew (1943)
56 HARv. L. REv. 899.
70. See Morris, loc. cit. supra note 69.
19431
TIE YALE LAV JOURNAL
concrete corollary propositions of procedure. These corollary proposi-
tions, the rules of law in operation, cannot be subsumed tinder either
premise without losing much of their pragmatic value. A working system
is usually indefensible in pure reason. We shall endeavor to state some-
of the rules and leave the superthdory to the ether.
This much at least is clear: where local law prevails, it is not to be
deemed incorporated by reference into the federal tax statute so as to
become a matter of federal law. Rather local law determines some ulti-
mate fact which, in turn, determines liability under the federal statute.
For instance, in the Stuart case,7 ' the critical question was not the state of
Illinois law or the ambiguity in Illinois decisions. For federal tax pur-
poses, the critical question was whether the corpus of the Stuart trust
might be revested in the grantor. Of course, it was necessary to consider
Illinois law in order to decide this latter question, but that circumstance
did not convert the Illinois law into anything more than an efficient cause
of the true gravamen of taxation. The operation of local law is strictly
that of a premise in a syllogism, of which the conclusion will be the ulti-
mate taxable, or non-taxable, fact. For example, if a mother creates a
trust, the income of which is payable to her children, she may be taxable
as to the income if she is responsible for her children's support. Her re-
sponsibility for her children's support is the critical fact. That fact is and
should be ascertained in terms of local law. Local law thus does not create
federal tax liability: its function is to determine independent juridical re-
lations upon which Congress may or may not choose to fasten a tax. In
terms of this analysis, the majority of the Supreme Court correctly regard-
ed the Stuart proceedings in the circuit court of appeals as determining an
issue of "fact" as to Illinois law, but characterized the conclusion below
inaccurately as "a finding of the ultimate fact." The "ultimate fact" was
the impossibility of the fund's return to the grantor. The ellipsis in
reasoning, which is perfectly apparent, tends to disguise the true function
of local law.
It is hardly necessary to repeat here all that has been written on the
application of the Erie Railroad case to pleading, evidence and burden
of proof. Although the case does not purport to control our topic, its im-
plications as to sources of local law are customarily observed.72 The
federal courts in tax cases, as in other fields of law, exercise a wide meas-
ure of judgment and discretion in their ascertainment of state law and
are by no means bound to a mechanical or imitative technique.73 Actually,
the net result is very frequently in terms of general common law con-
71. See Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154, 162 (1942).
72. Sometimes, as in the Howard case, the Erie doctrine has had a confusing effect.
See note 49 supra.
73. See Zlinkoff, loc. cit. mtpra note 63.
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cepts with local cases thrown in for appearance and good measure.74 There
are, of course, specific problems peculiar to tax litigation which require
particular mention.
In the first place, the presumption attaching to the Commissioner's
findings embraces every link in the chain leading to the assessment. Thus
local law may be presumed either to conform to or differ from general
law,75 as may serve the interests of the Treasury in the special case. Since
the taxpayer relies more often upon exceptions or peculiarities of his own
local law, the Commissioner is usually seen to resist these exceptions and
to contend for propositions of general application.
The cases show that there is virtually no limit to the types of evidence
by which local law may be proved. Statutes, ordinances, legislative his-
tory, decisions, textbooks and law review articles are frequently referred
to.76 It is interesting to note that judges' common law background is re-
flected in their emphasis upon decisions rather than upon statutes. Perhaps
they have learned how easily one can squeeze through, burrow under or
clamber over legislative language. In any event the broad statement seems
justified that decisions will be expansively, statutes restrictively, construed.
These considerations are intimately tied up with the burden of proof
as it may fall in the particular case. Prior to Pearce v. Commissioner 7
the Supreme Court had established the rule as to burden of proof in ali-
mony trust cases. Whether the Commissioner proceeded against the hus-
band or the wife, the taxpayer had the burden of proof; but the husband
was required to show by "clear and convincing proof" that his obligation
of support had terminated while the wife had only to establish doubts
and uncertainties as to discharge of the duty of support under local la,. 7"
The Pearce case demonstrated how little this distinction could contribute
to the development of a workable rule. The majority of the Court pro-
ceeded to enlarge the area of the wife's burden, rather than to permit her
to profit by its previous holdings. It preferred to re-examine the Texas
law and, finding that law uncertain as to the power of the local court to
add to the husband's obligations, nevertheless assessed the tax against
the wife for lack of proof that the local court also had power to remake
the particular consummated property settlement. Thus, as frequently oc-
curs in the various fields of private law, a shift in the scope and burden
of proof effected a shift in the applicable rule of substantive law.
74. See, for example, Colston v. Burnet, 59 F. (2d) S67 (App. D. C. 1932). As to
the vitality left in Swift v. Tyson, see Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S.
363 (1943).
75. See Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U. S. 149 (1940).
76. The Chief Justice's phrase is "all available data.' See Helvering v. Stuart, 317
U. S. 154, 171 (1942).
77. 315 U. S. 543 (1942).
78. See Comment (1943) 56 HAsv. L. REv. 428, 438.
1943]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
It is no longer important whether the majority was correct in the
Pearce case. The Revenue Act of 1942 " has rendered the principle prob-
lem academic, but it is still of significance that the requirement of "clear
and convincing proof" on the one hand as against mere doubts and un-
certainties on the other creates an unworkable technique of procedure.
Federal courts generally assume that there is discoverable local law on
every conceivable proposition. It is their duty to find it. Insofar as local
law contributes to the determination of a critical fact involving federal
tax liability, the burden of proving it as against the Commissioner's pre-
sumption should not vary from taxpayer to taxpayer. The Commis-
sioner's determination being prima facie correct, all taxpayers should
have the same burden of rebutting it. Departure from this policy will lead
to further confusion comparable to that of the Pearce case. A presump-
tion in favor of anyone other than the Commissioner must eventtlally be
honored in the breachY
s0
Availability of State Law. To what extent is the burden of proof met
by production of a local judgment or decree determinative of the same
set of facts? This question, simple on its face, presents no little em-
barrassment to the federal judiciary. On the one hand, there is the de-
ference naturally owed to a state court and the respect due to the parties'
reliance upon by its decree. On the other hand, experience shows how fre-
quently "constructions" are obtained upon the suggestion of the parties
in proceedings which, if not collusive, are at least "friendly." Then again,
the federal courts, in cases not involving diversity of citizenship, are gen-
erally reluctant to vie with state tribunals in the ascertainment of state
law because the state judge is presumably better equipped for the task
and because confusion must result from a conflict of views as to the
local rule.
Faced with this dilemma, the federal courts, have usually accepted the
state decree unless its collusive nature appeared on its face. 1 Of course,
79. See section 120 of the 1942 Revenue Act.
80. Even such a presumption as that the common, but not statute, law of other com-
mon law jurisdictions is the same as that of the forum can lead to confusion; the Coln.
missioner does not need it, and the taxpayer should be required to make out his case
without a priori aids. But in cases where this presumption might be availed of, the de-
sired result is often reached quite implicitly. See MERTENS, LAw OF IFEDERAL INcoME
TAXATION (1943) §§ 50.61-50.71, where instances of conflicting presumptions are dis-
cussed. The author concludes that the presumptions in favor of the Commissioner (like
other recognized presumptions such as that of regularity of corporate action) has no evi-
dentiary weight, that it does not create a "burden of proof," but simply a "burden of
going forward." Although there is much judicial language to that effect, the conclusion
seems to overstate actual practice, as illustrated by the Pearce case and summarized in
Rule 32 of the Tax Court.
81. See PAUL, op. cit. supra note 9, at 46; PAUL AND MERTENS, op. Cit. sapra note
9, at 15; Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 35 (1934); Otto C. Botz, 45 B. T. A. 970
(1941), appeal pending; C. C. Harmon, 1 T. C. 40 (1942) ; cases collected in Helvering
v. Rhodes' Estate, 117 F. (2d) 509 (C. C. A. 8th. 1941).
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a decree obtained ex parte or by consent of adversary parties should prove
nothing; but one resulting from a seriously contested proceeding in which
opposing interpretations were argued or briefed is entitled to acceptance,
even though secured during the pendency of the federal tax litigation and
for use therein. 2 Requirements in the tax court should include: evidence
of substantial opposition, at least to the extent of independent appearances
by attorneys for parties having adverse interests or guardians ad litem
for infants or incompetents; oral argument or submission of briefs;
serious attention devoted therein to the presently pertinent issue, so that
it shall not have been disposed of merely en passant; necessity of deter-
mining the particular issue, so that its disposition will not be obiter. If
the taxpayer can establish these four propositions, the decree should be ac-
cepted as fixing local law. If he cannot, the presumption attached to the
Commissioner's findings should not be rebutted by the decree alone. In
the latter case, the decree remains evidentiary of the state rule, its weight
to be measured in terms of all the circumstances, including the prestige
of the particular state court.s3 The question here is not whether the issue
was adjudicated in the sense of being res adjudicata, but how it was ad-
judicated.
To what extent may the Commissioner plead and prove local law for
the purpose of invalidating an executed transaction? It is assumed here
that the parties have completed the transaction and that they maintain
its validity-for example, a sale which, if executory, would be unenforce-
able under the local Statute of Frauds. The problem is largely substan-
tive, but its procedural implications make it appropriate for discussion
at this point. Obviously, some transactions, objectionable in their nature,
should not bind the Commissioner, while others, quite innocuous, should
be free from attack.
The general rule is that the tax courts will give effect to executed trans-
actions despite the Commissioner's contention of their invalidity under
state law. Nor may the taxpayer plead the illegality of his own executed
transaction, of another's transfer to him or of his transfer to another
for an illegal executory consideration. The virtue of antecedents is not
examined in the process of ascertaining economic consequences.s
Although the Commissioner cannot usually raise the local Statute of
Frauds as to executed sales, he is permitted to do so as part of a broader
82. See Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 5 (1937).
83. See Brainard v. Commissioner, 91 F. (2d) SSO (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), appcal dis-
missed, 303 U. S. 665 (1938).
84. See -Marbelite Corp. of America v. Commissioner, 30 B. T. A. 311 (1934), aff'd,
77 F. (2d) 713 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935); Joseph S. Finch, 23 B. T. A. 1153 (1931);
Francis M. Camp, 21 B. T. A. 962 (1930). However, in a recent decision, the local Rule
against Perpetuities was held available to the Commissioner to invalidate an inter vivos
trust created by the decedent and thus to add the corpus thereof, less the value of an
initial life estate, to the decedent's gross taxable estate. See Abby R. Smith, 1 T. C. 963
(1943).
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attack oii the characterization of the transaction. In Calston v. Burnet,
8D
for example, the absence of a written memorandum in an alleged agree-
ment between husband and wife was used as a makeweight by a skeptical
court. But if the relations involved are of unimpeachable good faith,
the tax courts will not disturb what the parties have done. Thus, al-
though local law prohibits contracts between husband and wife, bona fide
salaries paid by one to the other have been held deductible."'
There are, however, some instances in which the Treasury may rely
on local law to invalidate completely executed transactions. These ap-
pear to fall into three principal classes: those in which the transaction
violates such a strong rule of local public policy as to offend the judicial
conscience ;87 those in which local law prevents the transaction from being
"closed," as by giving an infant the right to revoke or rescind;s8 and those
in which local law prevents the transaction from coming into legal ex-
istence, as by prohibiting the issuance of non-voting stock!" Of course,
the most familiar instances fall under the first heading, involving such
matters as gambling losses, payments for bribes, and the like. These,
however, have little need of local statutes, for they are condemned by
general common law doctrines.
Conflict of Laws. Assuming that the result of a federal tax litigation
is determined by local law, what local law governs? This question has
heretofore received little attention, perhaps because those interested in
conflicts principles have been preoccupied with the problems of Klaxon
Company v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Company o and Griffin v.
McCoach, 1 or because choice of law arises only interstitially in the tax
courts. Whatever the reason, conflicts questions have lacked that detailed
and meticulous study so characteristic of federal tax scholarship.
It will be remembered that the Klaxon and Griffin cases imposed upon
federal courts the duty of applying local rules of conflicts as part of the
local law which they were bound to administer. But these cases involved
diversity of citizenship and, despite the generality of their language, do
85. 59 F. (2d) 867 (App. D. C. 1932).
86. See Samuel Shapiro, 29 B. T. A. 1012 (1934) ; Anna E. Riley, 29 B. T. A. 160
(1933).
87. This was one of the grounds of decision in Colston v. Burnet, 59 F. (2d) 867
(App. D. C. 1932). But the expenses of an illegal business, i.e., one held illegal by a
Post Office Department fraud order, have been deductible. Heininger v. Commissioner,
133 F. (2d) 567 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943). The existence of a federal "public policy" (under
whatever name or label) can hardly be ignored. It may invalidate transactions in which
local public policy finds no taint.
88. See note 59 supra.
89. See Rudolph Wurlitzer Co. v. Commissioner, 81 F. (2d) 971, 974 (C. C. A. 6th,
1936), for a noteworthy dissent.
90. 31"3 U. S. 487 (1941).
91. 313 U. S. 498 (1941).
[Vol. 52: 799)
LOCAL LAW IN FEDERAL TAXATION
not impinge upon the area of federal taxation. When Congress points
to state law in the application of a tax statute, it impliedly leaves to the
administrative and judicial machinery the task of ascertaining that law,
that is to say, the problems of conflicts as well as of municipal law. Of
course, it sometimes prescribes what are in effect statutory rules of con-
flicts, such as in the treatment of stock in domestic corporations owned
by a non-resident alien.12 Clearly, the power to levy taxes embraces the
incidental means.9" In general, however, conflicts problems are left to
the courts.
The ordinary rules of conflicts, as developed in the nations of the
western world, are highly abstruse and conceptual in nature and fre-
quently inappropriate to such a pragmatic operation as the collection of
taxes. What theories have evolved in the area of private international
law are a compound of history, metaphysics, commercial convenience,
accident and public policy. Perhaps the strongest single influence has been
the intellectual desire for symmetry. In any case, the rules and canons
of conflicts were not consciously designed to resolve tax cases, and their
effectiveness for that purpose is purely coincidental.
The juridic developments of the last fifteen years illustrate these re-
marks. Tax courts have, in constitutional cases affecting state juris-
diction,94 sharply modified the shape of traditional conflicts concepts, such
as ;nobilia sequunter personam, uniqueness of domicile and the categori-
zation of rents. As time goes on, we may expect the extension of this
process to choice of local law in federal tax litigation.
The implicit modification of rules of conflicts, which has already begun.
is based on the assumption that taxable transactions have an independent
economic situs. For tax purposes, the pertinent local law is that of the
economic situs, whatever other law might govern the property or trans-
action in ordinary civil litigation. Conflicts questions are viewed as super-
erogatory and are simply avoided. For example, in Lang v. Coninis-
sioner,95 the courts all assumed that domiciliai'y la, determined the na-
ture of premium payments upon life insurance policies, without regard
to the place of contract, the place of performance, the clauses of the poli-
cies showing the parties' intent or any other circumstance which might
control in a litigation between Lang or his beneficiaries and the insurance
companies." Lang's domicile fixed the economic situs of the payments.
No alternative local law was considered.
92. See I=. REv. CoDE §§ 862, 863 (1939).
93. See THE FFDERALIST (1788) No. 44.
94. See Guterman, Revitali:ation of Multiple State Death Taxation (1942) 42 COL
L. REv. 1249.
95. 304 U. S. 264 (1938).
96. In the certificate of the circuit court of appeals, no conflicts question ,as noted.
See Lang v. Commissioner, 23 Am. F. Tax R. 1145 (C. C. A. 9th, 193S). Nor did the
Board of Tax Appeals consider choice of local law, although at least four Lang policies
1943]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Such silent assumptions render difficult the task of a commentator.
Propositions of law thus grow out of what the court does, without light
from what it says. There are, however, a number of decisions in which
conflicts questions have been explicitly determined, and these enable us
to draw defensible conclusions. That the Klaxon rule has no application
is quite clear, for the federal courts in tax cases continue to apply the
rules of conflicts which in their opinion are best supported by reason and
precedent. But reason, precedent and even economic situs may bow to
the practical needs of an effectual tax system. For instance, when the
consequences of corporate action are involved, the law of corporate domi-
cile has been held to control, whatever the domicile of the individual stock-
holderY And when the transaction is one of frequently recurrent nature,
the courts will endeavor to apply a general presumption of local law in
the interests of ease and uniformity. 5  These legitimate objectives are
bound to qualify the traditional rules of conflicts. The presumption of
a specific state rule, viewed either as the weight of authority or as the
most easily administered, is a particularly provocative development.
The pull of economic situs has had an interesting effect upon "quali-
fication" issuesY9 In those cases in which qualification is most signifi-
cant, the tax courts have tended to look to the law of economic situs as
determinative. This is, of course, what occurred in the Fair case,100 in
which the question was whether Cuban hypotecas constituted real estate
located outside of the United States, and hence exempt from the federal
estate tax. The circuit court "qualified" the hypotecas, in conformity with
Cuban law, as real estate. That decision involved, not conflicts of
local law, but the interpretation of a federal tax statute. Hence, although
economic situs may afford a proper theoretical criterion of qualification
when conflicts of local law are involved, it does not support the conclusion
reached in the Fair case.
Two recent decisions illustrate the qualification problem in choice of
local law. Commissioner v. Skaggs 101 involved the community or sepa-
were with the Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York. See Julius C. Lang, 34 B. T. A.
337, 339 (1936). For the same general approach on this score, see Newman v. Co mnis-
sioner, 29 B. T. A. 53 (1933), aff'd, 76 F. (2d) 449 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935), cert. denicd, 296
U. S. 600 (1935) ; Cannon v. Nicholas, 80 F. (2d) 934 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935).
97. See Helvering v. McGlue's Estate, 119 F. (2d) 167 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941) ; Ru-
dolph Wurlitzer Co. v. Commissioner, 81 F. (2d) 971 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936); Estate of
Henry W. Putnam, 45 B. T. A. 517 (1941).
98. See Estate of Henry W. Putnam, 45 B. T. A. 517 (1941).
99. See Nussbaum, Characterization in the Conflict of Lairs (1940) 40 CoL. L, Rv.
1461.
100. Fair v. Commissioner, 91 F. (2d) 218 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937), criticized 1 PAUL, FED-
ERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (1942) 125-27. See (1937) 37 COL. L. REV. 500; Note
(1937) 46 YALE L. J. 687.
101. 122 F. (2d) 721 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941).
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rate property status of rents of California lands owned by a resident of
Texas. The court held that "the question whether property is real or
personal is to be solved by the law of the place where it is actually lo-
cated." Hence the rents were "qualified" in terms of California law.
From the standpoint of the conflict of laws this decision was the sheerest
petitio principii. Where the property was "located" was the very question
posed by the circumstances. But the court was on the right path; it dis-
missed the usual notions of imputed situs as "too artificial and tenuous"
and looked to economic realities.
Fooshe v. Commissioner 102 reached a comparable result, though on
less substantial grounds. There the petitioner, a married man, entered
into an agreement in 'Missouri calling for continued payment of certain
renewal commissions on life insurance sold there, all as part of his future
compensation for moving to California where he was to act as branch
manager. The court held these renewal commissions to be community in-
come because California law did not exclude from the marital community
property to which the husband had an "inchoate right" before he entered
the state. Whether the "doctrine of inchoate right" existed in Missouri
or in general law was not considered. Thus, again, the conclusion appears
to violate fundamental principles of qualification and to beg the criti-
cal question in the case.'"3 But whatever the reasoning, the result is sound.
Petitioner's services were rendered in California; his agreed compensation
was the exchange for those services-hence the right to renewal com-
missions had, as to him, its economic origin in that state.
We may conclude, therefore, that federal courts in tax cases employ
the customary rules of conflicts, unhampered by the Stentor doctrine, but
modified by the concept of economic situs and by devices designed for
ease of administration, such as the presumption of conformity of local
law to the general rule. These factors can hardly be compartmentalized;
they will inevitably leak over into other divisions of the law, and their
realistic influence should be all to the good.
Function of the Supreme Court. Three recent decisions, twu in the
field of taxation and the third in constitutional law, illustrate the subtle-
ties in federal relations, created by local law. In the Pearce case, the
majority of the Supreme Court investigated and found its own version
of Texas law. In Helvering v. Stuart,10 4 the majority declined to re-
examine the finding of the circuit court of appeals as to local law. In
Public Utilities Commission v. United Fuel Gas Company,1°' the majority
102. 132 F. (2d) 686 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942). Cf. Cerf v. Lynch, 237 App. Div. 283, 261
N. Y. S. 231 (1932), aff'd, 262 N. Y. 549, 183 N. E. 59 (1933).
103. See RESTATEmENT, CozzFmcrs oF LAWS (1934) § 7. See for analysis and criticism,
Robertson, A Surey of the Characteriation Problem in the Conflict of Laws (1939) 52
H.Rv L. REV. 747.
104. See 317 U. S. 154, 165 (1942).
105. 317 U. S. 456 (1943).
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made its independent determination of Ohio law-but with explicit reluc-
tance and only because of the felt pressure of "public interest." It is diffi-
cult to reconcile the positions of the individual Justices in these respective
decisions. That of Mr. Justice Frankfurter shows the most consistency
-dissenting in the Pearce case, joining with the majority in the Stuart
case, and expressly yielding to the exceptional compulsion of the facts
in the United Fuel case.
Every consideration in the normal case deters the Supreme Court from
"becoming a Court of first instance for the determination of the varied
rules of local law prevailing in the forty-eight states." 100 In the first
place, the circuit court is presumed to be well informed on the subject
since the pertinent local law is usually that of a state within its particular
circuit. One or more judges of the circuit court may be members of the
bar of the state in question, and, in any event, education in state laws
is an inevitable consequence of sitting on the circuit bench. Secondly, the
Supreme Court cannot "make" state law by its independent inquiry, but
may embarrass, offend or confuse.10 7 Thirdly, the task of finding local
law is incompatible with the business of the Court and with the calibre
of the issues which it considers. State law, as observed above, serves
only to determine circumstances and relations upon which Congress may
choose to fasten a federal tax. Its influence in the litigation is, therefore,
less than immediate. Finally, there are forty-eight states, and their laws
change and evolve from year to year. Thus practical considerations as
well as deference to federalism should induce the Court to refrain from
determining local law, however tempting this task sometimes may be.
But even this good rule has its exceptions. When, for instance, large
matters of public interest are involved, the Court's duty extends to in-
direct and-remote contributing causes. The dimensions of public interest
may be determined by considerations of political morality or by federal
apportionment of power or by actual revenue results. When in a par-
ticular case these factors assume impressive proportions, the Supreme
Court will not be deterred from its own inquiry into local law. Poe v.
Seaborn 108 offers a good illustration. There, circumstances invited the
Court to examine an institution, community property, common to several
states, peculiar in its historic derivation, and of far-reaching fiscal signifi-
cance. Whether or not the result was correct, the issues were large enough
to merit disposition by the Supreme Court, disposition which has guided
the several circuits in which community property cases frequently arise.
106. Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154, 164 (1942).
107. See Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 499 (1941). Where
local (procedural) law determining the appropriateness of remedy or the finality of state
action is in doubt, remanding the case to the state court is appropriate. See Whitman
v. Wilson, 318 U. S. 688 (1943).
108. 282 U. S. 101 (1930).
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It should be noted, however, that such instances are so rare that they sup-
port, rather than impair, the general rule.
The Supreme Court might consider the practicability of sanctioning
a rebuttable presumption of the uniformity of local rules. As we have
indicated, the Tax Court seems to gravitate toward such a presumption.
Perhaps that policy will aid the Commissioner in the performance of his
duties and facilitate the determination of doubtful cases. A general feder-
al rule, subject to rebuttal only upon clear demonstration of local law tc
the contrary, might reduce the problem of state diversity to its proper
and justifiable proportions. Perhaps this was the motive underlying the
Chief justice's dissent in Helvering s,. Stuart. But the suggestion should
be viewed with great care, for it involves all the complexities which cul-
minated in the Pearce case. Presumptions which may clash with that in
favor of the Commissioner's findings are undesirable.
There is one distinctly valuable service which the Supreme Court could
render to the sound administration of local law in federal tax cases. As
indicated, the circuit courts are groping toward tenable rules of conflicts
in those litigations in which choice of state law is involved. The criteria
have not become fixed, for the influence of economic situs upon traditional
conflicts concepts is as yet only implicit. Guidance by the Supreme Court
in the form of general propositions seems particularly appropriate.""0
Until such propositions are established, the selection of applicable local
law will remain uncertain and speculative.
Fundamentally, the Supreme Court as head of the administrative hier-
archy cannot afford to expend its energies on mere reproduction or repe-
tition of the functions of subordinate bodies. With respect to our topic,
its business consists first of the disposition of those matters of local law
which materially affect the federal tax system, and second, of furnishing
standards of guidance to the remainder of the assessment machinery.
We may hope that it will perform these functions in the instant field, as
it has done elsewhere.
IV.
Uniformity is more easily described than promoted. Once its virtues
have been summarized and its inescapable limitations perceived, we nat-
urally look for concrete measures of improvement. The objective surely
deserves most serious reflection, influencing as it does both fiscal returns
and equality of burden. Moreover, in a world of rapid and sudden change,
tax systems must be susceptible of quick conformance to new and un-
expected conditions. Only if the tax structure displays a high degree of
109. We have the scintilla of a beginning in the Stuart majority opinion, where the
Court points out that Illinois "is the residence of the parties, the place of esetution of
the instrument, as well as the jurisdiction chosen by the parties to govern the instrument."
Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154, 162 (1942).
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uniformity in operation, can it be readily adapted to shifts in the economic
scene and in the needs of government. What are the sources from which
greater uniformity may be expected to flow?
The Congress. Mr. Paul has called attention to the varieties of situ-
ations which "afford an obvious opportunity for Congress to indicate
more specifically, by the very language of the federal statute, whether
state law is to be respected or ignored." 11 While in the same study, he
warns against excessive "specificity in the terminology of federal stat-
utes," his general recommendation retains its force and value. The in-
sertion of a simple phrase, such as "under applicable law," "I at the
right place in a revenue act will sufficiently indicate intent to point to local
law. On the other hand, if Congress desires to ignore local differences
and distinctions, a statement to that effect in the committee reports
will usually suffice." 2 Definitions by statute are exceedingly dangerous
and should be approached with great trepidation.
In a recent article 113 the suggestion was made that Congress adopt
federal rules of conflict of laws. We are here concerned only with the
validity of that suggestion as it relates to taxation. Clearly, however,
conflicts rules suitable to ordinary litigation will prove inappropriate if
imported into tax proceedings. It has been shown that conflicts questions
in tax cases have their own peculiar aspect, colored as they are by con-
siderations of a unique character, deeply pragmatic and anti-conceptual.
They evolve and change from time to time, along with modifications in
the general tax structure. They should not be bound down by legislative
formalization. Here, at least, flexibility is more valuable than certainty.
When we come to the adjective side of the question, we find more con-
crete hope of promoting uniformity. The creation of a single appellate
tax court, as recommended during the past several years," 4 would un-
doubtedly forward this purpose. This proposal has elsewhere been treated
in detail and does not require extended discussion here. Its merits are by
no means confined to the present topic. That a single appellate court
would serve to reduce variations and differences in the incidence of taxa-
tion is hardly disputed, even by those who question the reform on other
grounds.
The Courts. Accurate demarcation of the area allotted to local law is
largely a judicial function. The Supreme Court in the Stuart case out-
lined a segment of that area, that is to say, rights arising out of wills,
110. See PAUL, op. cit. supra note 9, at 31.
111. Compare INT. REV. CODE § 812(b) (1939).
112. See Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U. S. 476 (1943).
113. See Schoch, Conflict of Laws in a Federal State: The Experiencc of Swlitaer-
land (1942) 55 HARv. L. REV. 738.
114. See Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure For Federal Income, Estate,
and Gift Taxes-A Criticism and a Proposal (1938) 38 COL. L. Rv. 1393. See also PAUL,
op. cit. supra note 9, at 51.
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trusts and decedents' estates. These elements of personal law are highly
indigenous in their nature and most intimately reflect the interest of the
respective states in the welfare and property of their citizens. Such local
law is entitled to particular regard. But this policy is susceptible of abuse.
It may be used to create local institutions involving tax privilege, where
nothing in the mores of the state justifies such action. If the courts then
extend federal tax benefits to such institutions, they make themselves
instruments of inequality and by the same token impair the legitimate op-
eration and prestige of local law.
For example, the Tax Court has recently accorded the customary in-
come tax privileges to the Oklahoma "optional community property"
system.11 In so doing, the Court rejected several contentions of the Com-
missioner, including one to the effect that the peculiar provisions of the
Oklahoma statute created a marital community in form only. Each spouse
retains, under Oklahoma law, such extensive control over community
property standing in his name, that the marital partnership can be re-
garded as a mere legal figment without substance.""0 Ioreover, the Okla-
homa community is "optional"; hence, only those spouses who agree in
writing to hold their property by community tenure are drawn without
the common law status.
This element requires more than passing thought. The Tax Court dis-
posed of it quite summarily. No distinction was seen between a communi-
ty property system operative only if invoked, as in Oklahoma, and one
operative unless expressly revoked, as in the traditional community prop-
erty states. But here, in terms of our analysis, we have a distinction with
a substantial difference. Assuming by way of hypothesis that Poe v.
Seaborn "' remains good law, the community property systems to which
it was intended to apply embodied tradition, history, local mores, and
statewide application. That these institutions permitted spouses to avoid
community tenure by express agreement, only served to prove the general
state rule. Local law was declared by the Supreme Court, in deference to
the scope and depth of that general rule, to control the situation. The
rationale of Dicas v. Earl 118 was deemed avoided, not by the skillful
election of individual arrangements, but by the structure and essential
nature of state institutions. WXhatever its label, a community property
115. See C. C. Harmon, 1 T. C. 40 (1942), followed in several Tax Court memoran-
dum decisions.
116. The Oklahoma community would appear to be one for federal ta% purposes only.
The wife's complete power of control and disposition over community property standing
in her name and the freedom thereof from liability for the husband's debts are hard to
reconcile with the statutory label, or with the purely theoretical protestation that each
"shall be vested with an undivided one-half interest" in the community property. 32 Ohla.
Stat. §§ 8, 56, 57, 58 (1941).
117. 282 U. S. 101 (1930).
118. 281 U. S. 111 (1930).
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system operative only if invoked by private contract is an anticipatory
arrangement for the shifting of income, unsupported by the philosophy
of Poe v. Seaborn.
It is because local law plays such a significant and irreducible role in
federal taxation that courts must be loathe to extend exceptions or to
credit peculiarities of state tenure. The criterion by which cases are to be
classified is subtle at best; it should never become merely mechanical.
Whenever the local statute appears to be inspired by the objective of
special tax privileges, unrelated to historic institutions of the state, it
must be examined with a high measure of skepticism. Otherwise, the de-
cisions of recent years prohibiting anticipatory arrangements 119 for the
transfer of income will be progressively undermined.
We have urged above that the Supreme Court should give special guid-
ance as to choice of local law in federal tax cases. This, it seems, should be
done as explicitly as possible. The Commissioner and the inferior courts
would profit much from express holdings on conflict of laws issues. In-
cidental advantage by way of increased certainty would accrue to tax-
payers and their counsel. These rules should be general in form and may
be entirely free of local theories and eccentricities.
Historic Causes. What will best promote uniformity is the everlasting
centripetal push within the United States. That push is now worldwide
and may soon be expressed through international implements. From
state to state, however, the process of coalescence becomes daily more ap-
parent, as does the increasing artificiality of local boundary lines. This
remedy is slow, but equally inevitable. Unitarianism of government will
probably not result, but in human affairs it is the emphasis that instructs,
and the emphasis is unmistakable.
Historic processes should be cultivated, not rushed. The time has hard-
ly come to ignore in taxation the very real interests and relations which
prevail in all other domestic activities. Local law is frequently the ex-
pression of profound psychological habits, from which men may be
induced, but not compelled, to depart. In due course the consolidation
of classes and the perception of national unity will erase these differences.
The American will some day be emancipated from geographical accident.
"But all this requires a conceived identification, of one's interests with
those of an unlimited community." 120
119. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112 (1940) ; Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U. S.
122 (1940).
120. See PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS (1931) 654.
[Vol. 52: 799
